| 1. |
- Berger, Christian, 1980, et al.
(author)
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Bridging Physical and Digital Traffic System Simulations with the Gulliver Test-Bed
- 2013
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In: Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics). - Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer Berlin Heidelberg. - 1611-3349 .- 0302-9743. - 9783642379734 ; 7865 LNCS, s. 169-184
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Conference paper (peer-reviewed)abstract
- We propose a cyber-physical platform that combines road traffic simulation, network simulation, and physically simulated vehicles to facilitate extensive testing on various levels of vehicular systems. Our design integrates physical and digital vehicle simulation into a common development and testing environment. This paper describes the platform design and presents prototypical implementations that use Simulator of Urban Mobility (SUMO), TinyOS Simulator (TOSSIM), a 3D sensor simulation environment, and a test-bed of miniature vehicles called Gulliver. As a prototypical implementation, we demonstrate the development of cooperative applications, and by that we achieve: (a) a cyber-physical system that provides a common environment for physically and digitally simulated vehicles, (b) a platform to interface communication between physically and digitally simulated vehicles, and (c) the ability to tailor testing scenarios in which some system components are simulated digitally and some physically. The suggested design provides flexibility, cost efficiency, and scalable testing opportunities for future vehicular systems. Furthermore, the proposed system is able to support novel steps towards intelligent transportation systems for smart cities. © 2013 Springer-Verlag.
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| 3. |
- Casimiro, Antonio, et al.
(author)
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KARYON: Towards Safety Kernels for Cooperative Vehicular Systems
- 2012
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In: Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics). - Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer Berlin Heidelberg. - 1611-3349 .- 0302-9743. - 9783642335358 ; 7596, s. 232-235
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Conference paper (peer-reviewed)abstract
- KARYON, a kernel-based architecture for safety-critical control, is a European project that proposes a new perspective to improve performance of smart vehicle coordination focusing on Advanced Driver Assistance Systems (ADASs) and Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS). The key objective is to provide system solutions for predictable and safe coordination of smart vehicles that autonomously cooperate and interact in an open and inherently uncertain environment. Currently, these systems are not allowed to operate on the public roads or in the air space, as the risk of causing severe damage cannot be excluded with sufficient certainty. The impact of the project is two-fold; it will provide improved vehicle density without driver involvement and increased traffic throughput to maintain mobility without a need to build new traffic infrastructures. The results will improve interaction in cooperation scenarios while preserving safety and assessing it according to standards. The prospective project results include self-stabilizing algorithms for vehicle coordination, communication and synchronization. In addition, we aim at showing that the safety kernel can be designed to be a self-stabilizing one.
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| 4. |
- Dolev, Shlomi, et al.
(author)
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Game Authority for Robust and Scalable Distributed Selfish Computer Systems
- 2007
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In: Proceedings of the twenty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing. - 9781595936165 ; , s. 356 - 357
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Conference paper (peer-reviewed)abstract
- Game theory analyzes social structures of agents that have freedomof choice within a moral code. The society allows freedom andselfishness within the moral code, which social structures enforce,i.e., legislative, executive, and judicial. Social rules encourage individualprofit from which the entire society gains. Distributed computersystems can improve their scalability and robustness by usingexplicit social structures. We propose using a game authority middlewarefor enforcing the moral code on selfish agents.The power of game theory is in predicting the game outcome forspecific assumptions. The prediction holds as long as the playerscannot tamper with the social structure, or change the rules of thegame, i.e., the prisoner cannot escape from prison in the classicalprisoner dilemma. Therefore, we cannot predict the game outcomewithout suitable assumptions on failures and honest selfishness.
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| 5. |
- Dolev, Shlomi, et al.
(author)
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Game authority for robust and scalable distributed selfish-computer systems
- 2010
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In: Theoretical Computer Science. - : Elsevier BV. - 0304-3975. ; 411:26-28, s. 2459-2466
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- Distributed algorithm designers often assume that system processes execute the same predefined software. Alternatively, when they do not assume that, designers turn to noncooperative games and seek an outcome that corresponds to a rough consensus when no coordination is allowed. We argue that both assumptions are inapplicable in many real distributed systems, e.g., the Internet, and propose designing self-stabilizing and Byzantine fault-tolerant distributed game authorities. Once established, the game authority can secure the execution of any complete information game. As a result, we reduce costs that are due to the processes' freedom of choice. Namely, we reduce the price of malice. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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| 7. |
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| 8. |
- Dolev, Shlomi, et al.
(author)
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Strategies for repeated games with subsystem takeovers implementable by deterministic and self-stabilising automata
- 2011
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In: International Journal of Autonomous and Adaptive Communications Systems. - 1754-8640 .- 1754-8632. ; 4:1, s. 4-38
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- Systems of selfish-computers are subject to transient faults due to temporal malfunctions; just as the society is subjected to human mistakes. Game theory uses punishment for deterring improper behaviour. Due to faults, selfish-computers may punish well-behaved ones. This is one of the key motivations for forgiveness that follows any effective and credible punishment. Therefore, unplanned punishments must provably cease in order to avoid infinite cycles of unsynchronised behaviour of 'tit for tat'. We investigate another aspect of these systems. We consider the possibility of subsystem takeover. The takeover may lead to joint deviations coordinated by an arbitrary selfish-computer that controls an unknown group of subordinate computers. We present strategies that deter the coordinator from deviating in infinitely repeated games. We construct deterministic automata that implement these strategies with optimal complexity. Moreover, we prove that all unplanned punishments eventually cease by showing that the automata can recover from transient faults.
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| 10. |
- Hoepman, Jaap-Henk, et al.
(author)
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Secure and Self-stabilizing Clock Synchronization in Sensor Networks
- 2009
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In: Prooceedings of the 9th Scandinavian Workshop on Wireless Ad-hoc Networks (Adhoc 2009). ; , s. 78-82
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Conference paper (peer-reviewed)abstract
- In sensor networks, correct clocks have arbitrary starting offsets and nondeterministic fluctuating skews. We consider an adversary that aims at tampering with the clock synchronization by intercepting messages, replaying intercepted messages (after the adversary's choice of delay), and capturing nodes (i.e., revealing their secret keys and impersonating them). We present the first self-stabilizing algorithm for secure clock synchronization in sensor networks that is resilient to such an adversary's attacks. Our algorithm tolerates random media noise, guarantees with high probability efficient communication overheads, and facilitates a variety of masking techniques against pulse-delay attacks in the presence of captured nodes.
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